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ARTICLES
SHOULD THE COURTS INCORPORATE
A BEST EVIDENCE RULE INTO THE
STANDARD DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY?.: ENOUGH IS ENOUGH
EVEN WHEN IT Is NOT THE BEST
Edward J. Imwinkelried'
"Striving to better, oft we mar what's well."'
At one time the best evidence principle dominated the law of
evidence.2 In a 1700 opinion, Chief Justice Holt referred to a re-
quirement for "the best proof that the nature of the thing will
afford ... , Midway through the 18th century Sir Geoffrey Gilbert4
authored one of the first English evidence treatises. In that treatise,
Gilbert proclaimed: "The first... and most signal Rule, in Relation to
Evidence, is this, That a Man must have the utmost Evidence, the
Nature of the Fact is capable of .... 5 Gilbert endeavored to "'sub-
sume the whole of the law [of evidence] under a single principle, 'the
best evidence rule.' 6 In the same vein, in his celebrated Commen-
taries, Blackstone stated that "the best evidence the nature of the case
will admit of shall always be required, if possible to be had."7 In the
19th century, American writers took up the same theme. Greenleaf,
t Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis. Former chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools.
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act , scene 4.
2 See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 248-56
(1988) (discussing the historical rise and fall of the best evidence rule).
" Ford v. Hopkins, 91 Eng. Rep. 250,250 (K.B. 1700).
4 See Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evi-
dence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1151-52 (1990) ("Sir Geoffrey Gilbert... wrote one of
the first English treatises devoted exclusively to questions of evidence.").
5 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1754).
6 William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL AND
TRULY TRMED 213 (Enid Campbell & Lewis Waller eds., 1982).
7 3 WiLLIAM BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES *268.
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for example, made the best evidence principle one of the central no-
tions of his evidence text.8
The principle, though, has waned in the 20th century. At the
turn of the century, Thayer pointed out that with one exception, there
was never a prevailing, full-fledged exclusionary rule that inferior
types of evidence are inadmissible.9 The exception related to docu-
mentary evidence. In that limited setting, the case law had recognized
a true exclusionary rule. As Thayer wrote, the published opinions
imposed a requirement that "if you would prove the contents of a
writing, you must produce the writing itself,"' and enforced the re-
quirement by barring secondary evidence of the writing's contents
such as copies and oral testimony about the writing. The modem un-
derstanding is that the best evidence rule is confined to documentary
evidence!1 The broad expression, "the best evidence rule," is both a
misnomer and potentially misleading.' 2 As one of the most popular
20th century treatises states, "there is no such general rule. The only
actual rule that the 'best evidence rule' denotes today is the rule re-
quiring the production of the original writing."'13 For that reason, it
has been seriously proposed that the doctrine be renamed the "Origi-
nal Document Rule."' That title would convey a much more accu-
rate sense of the narrow scope of the modem best evidence rule.
Even in that limited, diminished form, the rule is under attack.
Earlier this decade the California Law Revision Commission under-
took a study of the rule. In 1996, the Commission released the report
summarizing its study.15 The report asserts:
8 See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, §§ 82-97 (Boston,
Little Brown 1842) (identifying the best evidence rule as one of the primary rules governing the
admissibility of evidence); see also Nance, supra note 2, at 248 ("[T]he centrality of the best
evidence principle in Greenleafs conception of evidence law is undeniable.").
9 See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 505 (Boston, Little Brown 1898) ('The [best evidence rule] should be discarded, in any
sense of a working rule of exclusion .... In only one way.., is it possible any longer to use
this old phraseology with advantage.").
'0 Id. at503.
1 See, e.g., RONALD L CARLSON Er AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE
OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 639 (4th ed. 1997) ("The best evidence rule rests on the assumption
that one type of evidence, the original document, has superior trustworthiness. The common
law implements that assumption by demanding that the proponent produce or account for the
original document when the document's terms are in issue.") (emphasis added).
12 See id. at 640 ("As many commentators have noted, the expression the 'best evidence
rule' is a misnomer and, worse still, misleading.").
13 2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 229, at 61 (John William
Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992); see also Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d
37, 51 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the best evidence rule is not a general rule and that it applies
only in some limited ways to the production of documents).
14 See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 230, at 61 (defining the Original Document Rule
in terms identical to the traditional scope of the best evidence rule).
15 See 26 CAL. LAw REvISION COMMISSION, Best Evidence Rule 369 (1996).
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The Best Evidence Rule is an anachronism. In yesterday's
world of manual copying and limited pretrial discovery, it
served as a safeguard against misleading use of secondary
evidence. Under contemporary circumstances, in which high
quality photocopies are standard and litigants have broad op-
portunities for pretrial inspection of original documents, the
Best Evidence Rule is no longer necessary to protect against
unreliable secondary evidence. Because the rule's costs now
outweigh its benefits, the Law Revision Commission recom-
mends that it be repealed.
16
The California legislature adopted the Commission's recommenda-
tion by enacting the Secondary Evidence Act of 1998, California Evi-
dence Code §§ 1520-23.17 The new provisions expand the types of
written secondary evidence which are presumptively admissible over
a best evidence objection.18 Indeed, the first sentence of California
Evidence Code § 1521(a) now enunciates a general rule that "[tihe
content of a writing may be proved by otherwise admissible secon-
dary evidence."
19
Given the declining influence of the best evidence rule, it came
as a mild surprise in 1999 when it was seemingly proposed to extend
the rule to a new setting, namely the assessment of the admissibility
of expert testimony. The proposal appears in the 1999 supplement to
one of the foremost treatises on scientific evidence, Modem Scien-
tific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, co-
authored by Professors David Faigman, David Kaye, Michael Saks,
and Joseph Sanders.21 As the title of the treatise suggests, the treatise
covers several scientific disciplines as well as the law governing the
admissibility of testimony by experts from those disciplines. Chapter
1 of the treatise is devoted to an analysis of the admissibility stan-
dards. In particular, several sections of the chapter address the impact
of the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 had superseded
the common-law general acceptance test for the admissibility of pur-
16 Id. at 389.
17 Secondary Evidence Act of 1998, CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1520-23 (West Supp. 1999).
Is EDWARD J. INBVINKELRIED & TIMiOTHY HALLAHAN, 1MwVINKELRIED & HALLAHAN'S
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE ANNOTATED, §§ 261-62 (1999).
19 CAL. EvID. CODE § 1521 (West Supp. 1999).
20 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (recognizing the treatise as authori-
tative and citing the work numerous times throughout the opinion).
21 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TEsrmtyONY § 1-3.4[4], 17 (1997 & Supp. 1999) (concluding that "courts should,
wherever possible, adopt admissibility criteria that encourage expert communities to develop the
best possible information on legally relevant issues").
% 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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portedly scientific testimony.Y The Court ruled that under the new
statutory scheme, the pivotal question is whether the proffered testi-
mony qualifies as reliable "scientific ...knowledge" within the
meaning of that expression in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The
Court adopted an essentially methodological definition of science.24
Simply stated, the Court defined science as the process of formulating
hypotheses about phenomena in the corporeal world and then engag-
ing in experimentation or observation to falsify or validate the hy-
pothesis.2 The Court decreed that to qualify his or her proffered tes-
timony as "scientific... knowledge," the proponent must lay a foun-
dation establishing the empirical validation of the expert's underlying
hypothesis.26
Given the frequent use of expert testimony,27 it was to be ex-
pected that a large number of lower courts have had occasion to apply
the Daubert decision.28 In both their original text and their new 1999
supplement, Professor Faigman and his co-authors survey and critique
this growing body of case law.
Some of their observations in the 1999 supplement are non-
controversial. For example, they point out that the new Daubert test
will sometimes yield outcomes different from the more traditional
common-law, general acceptance standard.29 The authors add that the
lower courts are struggling with the question of how much validation
is "enough" to satisfy the now controlling statutory standards.30
Those observations are unquestionably accurate.
There are, however, other passages in the 1999 supplement
which are both a bit vague and potentially troublesome--passages
which suggest a proposal to incorporate a best evidence principle into
admissibility analysis under Daubert. In one passage, the authors
argue that the proponent's characterization of the proffered testimony
23 See generally id.
24 See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake ofDaubert: A Newv Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L REv. 715, 751 (1994) (arguing that the Court in Daubert
adopted a "scientific" framework for determining the admissibility of "scientific" evidence).
2 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching
Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise,
81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58 (1995) ("[The Daubert Court] described the scientific methodology in
classical Newtonian terms-the process of formulating hypotheses and then engaging in ex-
perimentation or observation to verify or falsify the hypothesis.") (citations omitted).
2 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, TRIAL, Sept. 1993 at 60, 62-64 (summarizing the holding in Daubert).
27 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1114, 1119 (finding
that experts testified in more than 80% of civil trials studied for the article).
28 See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and
Its Progeny, 29 CRGHToN L. REv. 939, 1035-89 (1996) (providing a case digest of significant
decisions applying Daubert prior to its publication).
29 See 1 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.3, at 1.
30 See id. § 1-3.4[3], at 13-14 (discussing the difficulties presented to courts in evaluating
scientific evidence under the various current statutory admissibility standards).
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should not be dispositive of the issue of which evidentiary restrictions
apply to the testimony.3' Rather, in two other passages, the authors
state that the trial judge should focus on "the nature of the legal ques-
tion to be answered, ' m or the "legally relevant issues. 3  These pas-
sages are reminiscent of the language in Holt, Gilbert, and Blackstone
that the trial judge should look to the nature of the issue to be re-
solved 4 After the judge has focused on that question, Professor
Faigman and his colleagues urge that "courts should, wherever possi-
ble, adopt admissibility criteria that encourage expert communities to
develop the best possible information on legally relevant issues.35
Employing a market metaphor, the authors state that like "a good
consumer, [the judge] can demand and receive a quality product. 3 6
These passages echo the insistence by Holt, Gilbert, and Blackstone
that the proponent tender the best evidence.
37
I have enormous respect for Professor Faigman and his col-
leagues, and I may simply be reading too much into these passages in
their 1999 supplement. 8 However, my fear is that these passages in
their 1999 supplement, suggesting the extension of a best evidence
"' See id. § 1-3.4[3], at 12.
32 Id. § 1-3.4[3], at 13.
33 Id. § 1-3.414], at 17.
3 See Ford v. Hopkins, 91 Eng. Rep. 250, 250 (KB. 1700) (referring to a requirement for
the "best proof that the nature of the thing will afford .... ); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at
*268 ("[Ihe best evidence the nature of the case will admit of shall always be required, if pos-
sible to be had .. "); GILBERT, supra note 5, at 3 ("Ihe first... and most signal Rule, in Rela-
tion to Evidence, is this, That a Man must have the utmost Evidence, the Nature of the Fact is
capable of .... ).
15 1 FAIGAN ET AL, supra note 21, § 1-3.4[4], at 17.
36 Id. § 1-3A[4], at 15.
37 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
" Shortly after the release of the 1999 supplement, I e-mailed Professor Faigman to ask
whether these passages were intended to advocate a best evidence principle in the context of the
analysis of the admissibility of scientific testimony. He kindly responded:
As for your question, I think we were not consciously intending to draw the parallel
to the best evidence rule, but our views are certainly in line with something like that.
You might say that we believe in a "best evidence rule, with a vengeance." Basi-
cally, we believe that courts should expect various professionals to use the tools that
are available to them. But this is actually a little more ambitious than simply saying
that bitemark people should use the best methods available to forensic specialists
who do bitemark identifications. If the scientific method would allow the entire pro-
fession to do better work, then the law should expect them to take advantage of that
methodology. This ... is the wonder of Daubert. It may be that handwriting people
are insular enough that they can self-validate one another and thus get through the
Frye door. But anyone who has even one semester of training in research methods
knows that what the handwriting identification folks are doing has not been vali-
dated - but it could be. I think the law should not only ask what are the best meth-
ods that handwriting experts use, but what methods might they use to evaluate their
expertise. Otherwise, an entire profession could insulate themselves from serious
Daubert scrutiny by remaining in the dark ages before the scientific method was dis-
covered.
(Copy of Professor Faigman's e-mail message on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review office).
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principle to the analysis of the admissibility of expert testimony,
might produce mischief. The thesis of this article is that it would be
unwise to incorporate a best evidence requirement into the legal stan-
dards controlling the introduction of expert testimony at trial.
The first part of this article describes both the Court's 1993 Dau-
bert decision and the passages in the authors' 1999 supplement com-
menting on the decision. This part of the article goes into greater de-
tail about the relevant passages in the 1999 supplement. Part I de-
scribes both the apparent proposal and the reasons which the authors
advance for the proposal.
Part II forecasts the impact of the adoption of the proposal. This
part explains that if implemented, this proposal would revolutionize
American evidence law.
Parts I and IV evaluate two versions of the proposal and argue
that it would be ill-advised to implement either version. Part I as-
sesses a version of the proposal as a mandate for an order of prefer-
ence among the proffered types of evidence. Part IV turns to another,
more modest version of the proposal as a guideline for evaluating the
sufficiency of the foundation for proffered scientific evidence. The
rhetoric of a best evidence principle might be alluring, but these parts
demonstrate that both versions of the proposal are unsound as a mat-
ter of evidentiary policy and the statutory interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Both versions would blur the distinction between
the admissibility of expert testimony on the one hand and its legal
sufficiency and weight on the other hand. Moreover, the second ver-
sion misconceives the basic conception of a foundation or predicate
for an item of evidence. The Conclusion adds that the adoption of the
proposal would also have unfortunate consequences in terms of
broader legal and social policies.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF DAUBERTAND THE APPARENT PROPOSAL TO
ADD A BEST EVIDENCE GLOSS TO DAUBERT
The apparent proposal by Professor Faigman and his co-authors
is a recommendation as to the proper manner of applying the Supreme
Court's teaching in Daubert. To appreciate the proposal, it must be
understood against the backdrop of the Daubert decision.
Prior to Daubert, the vast majority of federal and state courts
followed the Frye test for the admissibility of scientific evidence.39
The test not only enjoyed a widespread judicial following; it also had
a long lineage, dating back 70 years to the decision in Frye v. United
39 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1-5
(2d ed. 1993) (concluding that Frye was the controlling standard in the majority of federal and
state courts).
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States.40 The Frye court announced that in order to be admissible,
scientific testimony had to rest on a hypothesis that has gained "gen-
eral acceptance.' 41  In the majority opinion in Daubert, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged that the general test "has been the dominant
standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence
at trial.' 42 However, he concluded that Frye was no longer good law
because it had not survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Justice quoted Federal Rule of Evidence 402: "All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority.',
43
The rule makes no mention of case or decisional law. The Jus-
tice then quoted a 1978 article by the late Professor Edward Cleary,
the Reporter for the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee
for the proposition that "[i]n principle, under the Federal Rules no
common law of evidence remains.'"4 The rub was that the Frye test
was purely a creature of case law. There was no statutory text which
could reasonably bear the interpretation that it codified a general ac-
ceptance standard. As an uncodified standard, Frye had been im-
pliedly overturned by the adoption of Federal Rule 402.
Justice Blackmun quickly added, however: "That the Frye test
was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean ... that the
Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence." 45 In the textualist tradition of statutory interpre-
tation,46 Justice Blackmun attempted to derive the limits from the text
of the Federal Rules. He pointed to the expression "scientific...
knowledge" in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.47 Drawing heavily on
the amicus briefs submitted by scientific organizations,4 8 Justice
4 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41 See id. at 1012 ("mhe thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").
42 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,585 (1993).
41 Id. at 587.
4 Id. at 588.
4s Id. at 589.
46 See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on
tire Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 857, 864-68 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's movement toward a plain meaning
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court,
Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L REV. 745, 749-62 (1990) (dis-
cussing the Court's application of the plain meaning standard to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
But see Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 53 Ohio St. LJ. 1307, 1307-11 (1992) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence
should not be construed by traditional means of statutory construction).
47 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
41 See id. at 590.
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Blackmun stated that "[t]he adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding
in the methods and procedures of science."49 The Justice quoted the
amicus brief of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science to the effect that science "represents a process for proposing
and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject
to further testing .... ,,50 This line of reasoning led the Justice to con-
clude that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method."5' That method
requires that the expert's hypothesis be "supported by appropriate
[empirical] validation. ' 2
Justice Blackmun tried to give lower courts some guidance for
assessing the adequacy of the validation supporting a hypothesis. He
listed the following factors: whether the hypothesis is testable;53
whether it has been tested;54 whether the hypothesis has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; 55 the known or potential error
rate;56 "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation" ;57 and "general acceptance. '58 Although these
factors were intended to furnish some guidance to lower courts, Jus-
tice Blackmun cautioned that his list of factors was not "definitive." 59
Moreover, the Justice emphasized that the trial judge's inquiry must
be "flexible.,
60
As Professor Faigman and his colleagues quite correctly note,
the Daubert opinion does not give lower courts any specific direction
as to how demanding they should be in evaluating the empirical vali-
dation underpinning a scientific hypothesis. 61 The result has been a
49 Id.
50 Id. (emphasis in original).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 593.
54 See id.
5 See id. This factor can be circumstantial evidence that a hypothesis rests on sound
scientific methodology. As Justice Blackmun elaborated in Daubert, extensive publicity for the
hypothesis "increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Id
56 See id. at 594.
57 Id.
58 lId As in the case of publication, this can be relevant circumstantial proof that the
hypothesis is supported by reliable scientific methodology. If the hypothesis has been current
long enough to gain widespread acceptance, presumably a large number of scientists have scru-
tinized the underlying research and failed to find serious deficiencies in the methodology.
5' See id. at 593.
60 See id. at 594; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999) (reaf-
firming the flexibility of the reliability test and stating that Daubert's list of factors is not lim-
ited to scientific expert testimony).
61 See 1 FAIGMANErAL., supra note 21, § 1-3.4[3], at 14 ("[U]nderlying the admissibility
determination [of the trial court] lies the policy judgment of how demanding courts should be
regarding the level of experience or the amount of research that is necessary before testimony
will be allowed.").
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good deal of controversy.62  To begin with, the courts often differ
over the question of how high the bar should be for admitting scien-
tific testimony. For example, the courts are split over the issue of
whether polygraph readings constitute sufficiently reliable "scientific
... knowledge" under Rule 702.63 Likewise, the commentators are at
odds over the question of whether questioned document examination
meets the threshold for admission under Daubert.64
Professor Faigman and his colleagues wade into this controversy
in their 1999 supplement. The supplement makes several salient
points that strongly suggest that they are advocating the incorporation
of a best evidence principle into admissibility analysis under Daubert.
Doing so would at least partially resolve the controversy. The answer
to the question of when there is "enough" validation would be only
when the validation is the best which science has to offer.
To begin with, the authors make the negative point that the judge
should not accept the witness' or proponent's characterization of the
proffered testimony in deciding which evidentiary restrictions are ap-
plicable.65 They expressly criticize a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit for the stated reason that the court accepted
that characterization rather than considering "the nature of the legal
question to be answered. 66 Next, as the last paragraph indicates, the
authors affirmatively urge trial judges to begin their analysis by fo-
cusing on the nature of the question to be answered or, as they write
62 See Fenner, supra note 28, at 939 (discussing the interpretations and misunderstandings
arising out of the Daubert decision).
63 See James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility
After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (examining past and present polygraph ad-
missibility law under both Daubert and other appellate decisions).
64 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New "Post-Daubert World"-- A Reply to
Professor Moenssens, 29 SErON HAL. L. REv. 405 (1998); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J.
Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Exper-
tise, 82 IOWA L. REv. 21 (1996) (examining the history of handwriting analysis, the nature and
dependability of the identification process, and recent court decisions concerning the admissi-
bility of evidence using these techniques); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism ofIgnorance as
a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification Expertise, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 731 (1989) (questioning the validity of handwriting expertise and discussing the
importance of empirical testing on the results of handwriting analysis). But cf. Andre A. Moens-
sens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251
(1997) (suggesting several different factors for determining reliability under Daubert but urging
the continual admissibility of handwriting testimony).
65 See 1 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.4[3], at 12-13 (discussing the need for an
evaluation of testimonial evidence separate from the assurances of the testifying witness).
6 Id. § 1-3.413], at 13 (criticizing Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (1 1h
Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999)). The Su-
preme Court's 1999 decision in Kumho lends support to this portion of the authors' analysis.
The Court ruled that regardless of whether expert testimony is scientific or nonscientific in
character, the trial judge must conduct a Daubert-style inquiry into the reliability of the testi-
mony. See Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1179. Thus, the proponent cannot escape the requirement of a
showing of reliability by simply labeling his or her testimony "nonscientific."
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in another passage, the "legally relevant issues." 67 Lastly, the authors
state that judges should demand the "best possible [scientific] infor-
mation ' 68 available on the legally relevant issue. Cumulatively, these
passages strongly imply a proposal that a best evidence principle
should be an integral part of admissibility analysis under Daubert.
The authors advance two arguments favoring this apparent pro-
posal. One is that the proposal will increase the accuracy of judicial
fact-finding:
The law is itself a marketplace for experts-scientific, tech-
nical, specialized and pseudo. As in most markets, if the law
proves to be a bad consumer, it is more likely to get a bad
product. But, [if it] is a Aood consumer, it can demand and
receive a quality product.
The authors conclude that the "justice system will be better for [this
approach].'70 A further argument is that this approach is calculated to
enhance the state of scientific research. The authors opine that the
rigor of "[a]dmissibility rules [can] have a significant impact on the
way, and whether, research is done., 71 The authors fear that a con-
trary approach might create an incentive for scientific witnesses "to
refrain from conducting any research at all ... ,72 If the courts are
uncritical and act as "passive consumers of whatever opinions expert
communities' decide to produce,' 73 scientists will feel little pressure to
support their claims with "creditable research."74
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
APPARENT PROPOSAL TO INCORPORATE A BEST EVIDENCE RULE
INTO THE ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD UNDER DAUBERT
At first blush, there is an immediate attraction to any proposal
that promises to make available to the courts the best possible scien-
tific information relevant to the factual disputes the courts are called
upon to resolve. However, before rushing to embrace the proposal,
we should appreciate its impact. Simply stated, the adoption of the
proposal would work a revolution. Aside from the formal best evi-
dence rule confined to documentary evidence,75 modem American
evidence law does not recognize anything approaching the proposed
67 See 1 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.4[4], at 17.
6 id.
69 Id. § 1-3.4[3], at 15.
70 Id. § 1-3.414], at 17.
71 Id. § 1-3.4[3], at 15.
72 id.
73 Id. § 1.3-414], at 17.
74 Id. § 1-3.413], at 14.
75 See FED. R. EVID. 1002 ('To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original writing, recording, or photograph is required ....").
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best evidence rule preferring the optimal scientific testimony. Today
scientific evidence is at least theoretically available to help a court
resolve virtually any factual issue; if the court was insistent, the pro-
ponent might be able to produce scientific evidence on almost any
issue. Yet, the courts routinely accept seemingly inferior types of
proof on litigated issue. There is not even a judicial inkling that the
availability of superior scientific testimony renders alternatives types
of evidence inadmissible.
At present, there is certainly no order of preference among the
types of proffered testimony. To begin with, there is no preference
for such testimony over lay factual testimony. For example, as a
matter of course the courts admit lay eyewitness testimony.7 6 The
courts are receptive to eyewitness testimony even though there is a
massive amount of research indicating that lay eyewitnesses are fre-
quently mistaken.77 To be sure, there are some constitutional restric-
tions on the introduction of such testimony; and in extreme cases,
those restrictions might mandate the exclusion of the testimony.78
However, those constitutional restrictions rarely come into play to
render eyewitness testimony inadmissible. In most cases, so long as
the proponent lays a foundation demonstrating that the witness satis-
fies the statutory foundational requirement for personal knowledge,7
9
the courts receive the testimony without hesitation. In a given case, if
the eyewitness had limited perceptual ability and the conditions for
observation were less than ideal, it might be evident that a scientific
analysis of available genetic markers was a far more reliable method
of determining the identity of the participants in the relevant event.
76 See, e.g., PATRICK M. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965)
(examining the use of lay witness testimony in criminal trials, despite the problem of false iden-
tification of suspected criminals).
77 See, e.g., H. E. Egeth & M. McCloskey, Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Behavior:
Is It Safe and Effective?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 283, 292 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus eds. 1984) ("Accurate identification of the criminal was made by 33%, 50%, and 74% of
the witnesses in the poor, moderate, and good viewing conditions, respectively."); ELIZABETH F.
LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 135-37 (1979) (presenting evidence that approximately 85%
of the 2,145 eyewitnesses incorrectly selected an assailant from a simulated six-person lineup);
A. DANIEL YAPMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY 156 (1979) (citing a study
in which only 14 of 52 witnesses accurately identified a suspect in a lineup; 19% of witnesses
failed to make any identification; and 44% of the witnesses identified an innocent person);
Felice J. Levine & June L. Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079, 1101 (1973) (providing statistics concerning the accu-
racy of recognition of pictures after fixed intervals of time).
71 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that an in-court identification
violated the Sixth Amendment since the identification would not have been possible but for an
out-of-court lineup that occurred outside the presence of counsel); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) (holding that an out-of-court identification from a lineup outside the presence
of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment).
7 See FED. R. EViD. 602.
o See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 39, § 17, at 529 (discussing genetic
marker analysis in general); 2 GIANNELLI & IMWVINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE § 18, 1 (2d
ed. 1993) (discussing DNA testing in particular).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
A 1996 Department of Justice report81 documented 28 cases of
defendants who had been wrongfully convicted---usually on the basis
of eyewitness testimony82-but later secured post-conviction relief on
the basis of exculpatory DNA test results. As in these cases, expert
testimony can be used to attack the weight of lay factual testimony;
and in some cases, reasonable persons would probably agree that sci-
entific testimony is better evidence, if not the best evidence, on the
issue of identity. However, to borrow Blackstone's description of the
best evidence rule, there is no authority excluding the lay factual tes-
timony on the ground that it is not "the best evidence the nature of the
case will admit of ....
At the next level, there is no enforceable preference for scientific
opinion over lay opinion. Consider, for example, the question of a
person's sanity. It is well settled that a witness acquainted with the
person in question may express an opinion about the person's san-
ity.84 For example, California Evidence Code § 870(a) provides: "A
[lay] witness may state his opinion as to the sanity of a person when
. .. [t]he witness is an intimate acquaintance of the person whose
sanity is in question .... ", 85 If the witness knows the person's base-
line behavior, the witness may opine whether the person's behavior
on a particular occasion departed from the baseline so markedly that
the person was acting in an aberrant, insane manner. However, expert
testimony is also admissible on the topic of insanity. 86 When the ex-
pert relies on diagnostic criteria that have been empirically vali-
dated,87 a strong case can be made that the expert opinion is more
81 See generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ES-
TABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996).
82 See Robert E. Wenk, Review of. Connors et al. Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Cases Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, 42 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 750, 750 (1997) ("I attempted to quantify the reasons for the initial miscarriage
of justice in the cases. About 75% involved identity errors by eyewitnesses.").
8 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *268.
84 See, e.g., Estate of Clegg v. Wiebe, 151 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (upholding
admission of a doctor's testimony as evidence of competence); Spillman v. Estate of Spillman,
587 S.W.2d 170 (rex. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the trial court correctly allowed lay witness
testimony about the testatrix's mental competence).
8 CAL. EVID. CODE § 870(a) (West 1995).
86 See FED. R. EvID. 704(b) (An expert witness may testify to the mental state or condi-
tion of a defendant in a criminal case, but may not opine directly on the elements of the crime or
defense).
87 Many of the diagnostic criteria included in the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV ("DSM IV") (4th ed. 1994) have been
validated in that manner. In the late 1960's and 1970's, mental health researchers strove to
develop a harder, more medical, model for diagnosis. See John P. Feighner et al., Diagnostic
Criteria for Use in Psychiatric Research, 26 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 57 (1972) (stressing
the need for scientific criteria to aid in diagnosis and for providing a framework by which to
compare data in the treatment of mental illness); Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical
Model to the Legal System, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 377 (1987) (theorizing that the problems asso-
ciated with the insanity defense and civil commitment could be resolved through the use of a
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likely to be accurate than a mere lay opinion. Yet, in this setting as
well, there is no authority for the proposition that the availability of
expert mental health testimony renders arguably inferior lay opinion
evidence absolutely inadmissible. The only admissibility hurdles for
such lay opinions are the specific statutory restrictions applicable to
that type of evidence.88
At still another level, there is no preference for scientific expert
testimony over non-scientific expert testimony. Assume, for exam-
ple, that the question is the chemical identity of a substance seized
from an accused. There is a growing body of case law allowing expe-
rienced police officers to testify to an opinion about a substance's
identity, based upon the visual appearance of the substance.89 In
many of these cases, the courts permitted the testimony on the theory
that the officer qualified as a non-scientific expert.90 However, an
opinion based solely on the substance's superficial appearance is sus-
pect, since there are many "look-a-like" drugs.91 Objectively, the re-
liability of that type of "expert" opinion pales in comparison to an
opinion based on an analysis of the substance by gas chromatogra-
phy/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). 92 The Supreme Court itself has
medical model of mental illness). There was a concerted effort to implement a medical model
in DSM IV. The preparation of the fourth edition included:
One hundred fifty reviews of the scientific literature were accomplished by the end
of 1989 to obtain an empirical data base for decision making. Individuals of each
work group ... focused on specific issues unanswered by the literature reviews and
drew upon the resources of unpublished data sets. The re-analysis of 50 separate
sets of data were used .... The Field Trials took place from 1991 through 1993.
This project was carried out at a total of 88 universities and research institutions...
involving more than 7,000 subjects ....
William D. Weitzel, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition
(DSM-IV), THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 1994, at 25-26.
There are indications that the use of empirically validated criteria has improved the
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. See Richard Rogers, Assessment of Criminal Responsibility:
Empirical Advances and Unanswered Questions, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 73, 78 (1987) ("The
data suggests that forensic psychiatrists and psychologists may be slightly more reliable with the
volitional than cognitive prong .... ).
s See FED. R. EviD. 701 (stating that lay witnesses may testify as to their opinion only
when the opinion is rationally based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to develop a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 144 F.3d 104 (Ist Cir. 1998) (holding that a detec-
tive's testimony identifying a substance as cocaine was properly admitted as evidence despite
the fact that the detective lacked formal scientific training). But see Michael D. Blanchard &
Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule
Permitting Visual Identification of indescript White Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM.
U. L. REV. 557 (1998) (criticizing the growing number of cases which allow visual identifica-
tion of narcotics).
90 See Blanchard & Chin, supra note 89, at 563-65 (citing several cases in which courts
failed to apply the Daubert test to "non-scientific" experts meeting the statutory requirements
for admissible opinion testimony).
9' See id. at 569.
92 See 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 80, at § 23-3(C) (discussing GC/MS
testing generally).
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recognized the accuracy of GCMS analysis. 93 GCMS is the "gold
standard,, 94 widely regarded as the "most accurate 95 and "most reli-
able"96 analytic technique. Yet, once again the possibility of obtain-
ing a superior scientific opinion does not preclude the introduction of
the non-scientific expert opinion. If the opinion satisfies the statutory
requirements--the witness has extensive experience and the witness's
inference is more likely to be reliable than the trier's conclusion on
the issue97 -the non-scientific expert opinion qualifies for admission.
Further, as a matter of admissibility analysis, there is no enforce-
able preference for superior scientific opinions over other scientific
opinions. As previously stated, it is clear that in most instances,
GC/MS analysis is the most reliable test which an unknown substance
can be subjected to in order to determine whether the substance is a
contraband drug. However, the cases are legion, admitting opinions
based on other scientific tests such as thin layer chromatography, high
pressure liquid chromatography, gas chromatography, and radioim-
munoassay. All these other tests are nonspecific; that is, they can
yield false positive results with substances other than contraband
drugs.99  The reliability of opinions, based on these nonspecific tests,
is markedly inferior to the trustworthiness of an opinion, resting on a
properly conducted GCMS analysis. Yet, in this setting as well, the
availability of a superior scientific mode of analysis does not fore-
close the admission of other scientific evidence. If the court is other-
93 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 n.2 (1989)
("GC/MS tests [are] highly accurate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement
techniques.").
9 See David J. Greenblatt, Urine Drug Testing: What Does It Test?, 23 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 651, 655 (1988) (examining the use of GC-MS testing on urine to detect drug usage);
Tamara L. Riley, Toward a Drug Free Military, 5 CRI. JusT. 10, 13 (1991) (discussing the use
of drug testing to eliminate drug abuse in the military).
95 See Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1192 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing the accu-
racy of GC/MS testing as "nearly infallable").
96 See L. Diane Baugh et al., Simultaneous Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry
Assay of Methadone and 2-Ethyl-l,5-Dimethyl-3,3-Diphenylpyrrolidine (EDDP) in Urine, 36 J.
FORENSIC SC. 548, 548 (1991) ("GC/MS procedures are considered the most reliable and are
the preferred confirmatory method.").
97 See FED. R. EvID. 702 (allowing expert testimony when it will "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
98 See 2 GIANNELLI & IMWNKELRiED, supra note 80, § 23-4, at 321-22 (collecting cases).
9 See id. § 23-2, at 273-304 (describing several testing procedures that may provide false
positive results); see also Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and
the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 965 (1999). The authors
state that:
courts should be wary of excluding DNA evidence on the grounds that better evi-
dence would be possible. There is no limit to that logic .... If using twelve mark-
ers is good, using thirteen is better - and fourteen better yet. [Tlhe evidence should
not be excluded on the grounds that the prosecution might have produced better evi-
dence yet. The defense can, if it wishes, point out limitations of the evidence and
opportunities the prosecution did not explore.
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wise convinced that the proffered mode of analysis satisfies Rule 702
and Daubert, an opinion resting on that analytic technique is admissi-
ble over objection.
The above paragraphs demonstrate that outside the confines of
the best evidence rule proper, there is no enforceable order of prefer-
ence among the various types of evidence. Of course, a best evidence
principle could operate at a different level, namely, as a guideline for
assessing the sufficiency of the foundation for proffered evidence.
However, with one exception, there does not appear to be a general
requirement that the foundation for a scientific opinion include the
best type of proof. In applying Daubert, one federal district court
commented: "For his testimony to be reliable, and, thus, admissible
under Daubert, [the expert] need not have used the best method avail-
able, only a reasonable one." 1°° To date, only one notable exception
has emerged:
Courts after Daubert appear to be taking a type of "best evi-
dence" approach to animal studies. That is, if reliable epi-
demiological studies are extant, then an expert's use of con-
trary animal studies is considered inconsistent with the sci-
entific method. On the other hand, if there are no epidemiol-
ogical studies on the subject, then a reliably conducted ani-
mal study can be used as part of the basis of an expert's
opinion.
Even this so-called exception is narrow in scope; while the cases in
this line of authority require that the expert rely on epidemiological
studies when they are available, even these cases do not purport to
announce a sweeping requirement that the proponent have epidemiol-
ogical studies conducted. Thus, as a general proposition, contempo-
rary expert testimony law does not embody a best evidence principle
either as an order of preference among the types of proffered evidence
or as guideline for gauging the adequacy of a foundation for an item
of expert testimony.
II. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ONE VERSION OF THE PROPOSAL
TO INCORPORATE A BEST EVIDENCE RULE INTO THE ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARD UNDER DAUBERT, NAMELY, A MANDATE FOR AN ORDER
OF PREFERENCE AMONG THE TYPES OF PROFFERED SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
Part II pointed out that the implementation of this best evidence
proposal would drastically change the current state of the law. The
Introduction noted that the modem cases and statutes confine the op-
10 Lentz v. Mason, 32 F. Supp.2d 733, 746 (D.N.J. 1999).
I01 Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REv. 699,716 (1998).
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eration of the formal best evidence rule to documentary evidence.
Part II added that there certainly is no best evidence principle opera-
tive in the context of lay or expert opinion evidence.
The fact that the adoption of a proposal would work a revolution
should give us pause. However, standing alone that fact should not
be dispositive. There have been recent "revolutions" in evidence
law. 02 Moreover, as Professor Faigman and his co-authors quite cor-
rectly point out, in federal practice the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence turns on the statutory construction of Federal Rule 702;103 and
the expression, "scientific knowledge," in Rule 702 is hardly self-
defining.1°4 The statutory language itself is arguably expansive
enough to bear the interpretation that it incorporates a best evidence
principle. The proposal should not be dismissed out of hand. Quite
to the contrary, the proposal should be evaluated on its merits.
As Part II explained, the proposal could take two forms. One
form would be a mandate for an order of preference among the prof-
fered types of evidence. However, on balance, it would be wrong-
minded to read such an order of preference into Rule 702. Reading
Rule 702 in that fashion would be a misconstruction of the Federal
Rules. 10 5 The Federal Rules were not intended to work such a
"seachange [in] federal evidence law."'1 6 The text and history of the
Rules foreclose any attempt to extend the reach of the best evidence
rule without a more express statutory mandate. Further, prescribing
an order of preference in Rule 702 admissibility analysis would blur
the line between admissibility on the one hand and legal sufficiency
and weight on the other.
A. Reading a Best Evidence Requirement into Rule 702 Would
Represent a Misconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun characterized the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a "permissive" statutory scheme with a "liberal thrust."'07
102 See Faust Rossi, The Silent Revolution, LMG., Winter 1983, at 13 (noting various
"revolutions" in evidence law).
103 See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL.., supra note 21, § 1-3.4, at 29-30 (noting that Daubert is ex-
pressly limited to "scientific knowledge" and that the Court "did not comment on whether the
validity standard extends to technical or specialized knowledge").
104 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARnozo L. REv. 1999, 2001-02 (1994) (describing the difficulties with defining "scientific
knowledge" under Daubert and suggesting a "flexible" approach to applying the Daubert stan-
dard).
105 See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
a judge may admit an opinion "even if the judge believes there are better grounds for some
alternative conclusion") (internal quotations omitted).
06 Capra, supra note 101, at 735 (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d
1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).
107 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (quoting Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
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It would be inconsistent with that thrust to impose a new, unprece-
dented restriction on the admission of scientific evidence. Further-
more, the legislative history of the Rules indicates that the drafters
intended to relax the best evidence rule proper. Even more to the
point, the history manifests the drafters' intent that there would not be
any best evidence principle operative in admissibility analysis under
Article VII.
1. The Drafters' Intent to Relax the Best Evidence Rule Proper in
Article X
The intent to liberalize the best evidence rule is evident in sev-
eral Notes accompanying provisions in Article X, setting out the best
evidence doctrine. One pertinent Note accompanies Rule 1001. That
Note begins with the following observation:
In an earlier day, when discovery and other related proce-
dures were strictly limited, the misleading named "best evi-
dence rule" afforded substantial guarantees against inaccura-
cies and fraud by its insistence upon production of original
documents. The great enlargement of the scope of discovery
and related procedures in recent times has measurably re-
duced the need for the rule.108
Rather than abolishing the rule, the drafters undertook to cut
back on its scope. In part, they did so by expanding the types of
writings which are deemed "duplicates" and therefore presumptively
admissible. At common law, the courts generally limited the scope of
that term to documents prepared at the very same time as the origi-
nal. 109 However, the drafters opted to expand the definition under
Rule 1001(4) to include any document prepared by reliable mechani-
cal or electronic means of reproduction even if the document comes
into existence well after the creation of the original.110 The Note ex-
plains that the narrow, common-law definition had the effect of ex-
cluding "'copies' produced by methods possessing an accuracy which
virtually eliminates the possibility of error."'
The Note to Rule 1004 is even more revealing. At common law,
many jurisdictions recognized degrees of secondary evidence, prefer-
ring one type of secondary evidence (such as a written copy) over
'0' FFD. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee's note.
'9 See 2 MCCORIMIcK, supra note 13, § 236, at 74 (stating that "simultaneous creation"
explains the more favorable treatment of carbon copies relative to photographic and xerographic
reproductions at common law).
"o See FED. R. EVID. 1001(4).
.. FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee's note.
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another (such as oral testimony about the writing's contents). 12 The
drafter repudiated that view and stated flatly in their Note that Rule
1004 "recognizes no 'degrees' of secondary evidence." '13 As in the
case of the expansion of the definition of "duplicate," the drafters
elaborated to explain their decision:
While strict logic might call for extending the principle of
preference beyond simply preferring the original, the formu-
lation of a hierarchy of preferences and a procedure for
making it effective is believed to involve unwarranted com-
plexities. Most, if not all, that would be accomplished by an
extended scheme of preferences will, in any event, be
achieved through the normal motivation of a party to present
the most convincing evidence possible and the arguments and
procedures available to his opponent if he does not.
1 4
In short, rather than regulating the problem by a formal admissibility
standard, the drafters relegated the issue to a consideration affecting
the argument over the proper weight to be given the evidence.
2. The Drafters' Rejection of any Best Evidence Principle in
Article VII
As we have seen, the text and Notes accompanying Article X
evidence a general intent to relax the best evidence rule in federal
practice. Even more specifically, the corresponding text and Notes
for Article VII manifest an intent that there would be no best evidence
principle operative under that article regulating the admissibility of
opinion testimony.
Article VII contains Rules 701-06. Rule 701 governs the admis-
sibility of lay opinion while Rule 702 controls the introduction of ex-
pert opinions. Although Rules 1002-03 state a preference among
certain types of evidence of a document's content, the text of Article
VII does not contain even a faint suggestion that as a matter of admis-
sibility, there is a preference as between lay and expert opinion.
Moreover, like the Note to Rule 1004, the Note to Rule 701 indi-
cates that the drafters contemplated treating the problem as an issue of
weight rather than formal admissibility regulation. The text of Rule
701 states that the judge may admit lay opinions which are "helpful"
to the trier of fact. 15 The drafters point out that this standard differs
112 See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 241, at 84-85 (concluding that at common law, the
majority of courts that have considered the question have recognized degrees of secondary
evidence).
113 FED. R. EvID. 1004 advisory committee's note.
114 Id.
"5 See FED. R. EvID. 701.
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from the "necessity" test often applied at common law. n6 The draft-
ers defended their choice of a helpfulness standard in the following
manner:
The rule assumes that the natural characteristics of the adver-
sary system will generally lead to an acceptable result, since
the detailed account carries more conviction than the broad
assertion, and a lawyer can be expected to display his witness
to the best advantage. If he fails to do so, cross-examination
and argument will point up the weakness.
117
Rule 702 and its Note confirm this interpretation of Article VII.
On its face, Rule 702 permits the introduction of expert opinions by
witnesses possessing "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge."" 8 Just as there is no provision in Article VII which pur-
ports to create a preference as between lay and expert opinion, there is
no language in Rule 702 indicating a preference among the various
types of expert opinion.
The third paragraph of the Note to Rule 702 says in effect that
there is no statutory requirement that the witness be a specialist. The
drafters state that "[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use
of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the
trier."119 The issue is not how well the witness fares in comparison to
other experts in the same field; the question is not whether this wit-
ness is the "best" possible expert. Rather, under the statute and Note,
the question is whether the witness is better qualified than the trier of
fact to draw the inference in question.
The fourth paragraph of the same Note sanctions the admission of
clearly inferior types of opinion testimony. For example, the Note
states that without more, a landowner may opine about the value of
his or her own land. 20 The landowner may testify on that subject
even though he or she has no formal training or experience in land
valuation other than ownership of the property in question. If there
were any best evidence principle operative under Article VII, that
species of testimony would unquestionably be deemed inadmissible.
116 See FED. R. EviD. 701 advisory committee's note ("Vhile the courts have made con-
cessions in certain recurring situations, necessity as a standard for permitting opinions and con-
clusions has proved to be too elusive and too unadaptable to particulai situations for purposes of
satisfactory judicial administration.").
117 id.
"' FED. R. EVID. 702.
119 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
120 See id. ("[W]ithin the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the
word... but also the large group sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or land-
owners testifying to land values.").
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B. Enforcing a Best Evidence Requirement under Rule 702 Would
Confuse the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony with its Legal
Sufficiency and Weight.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun emphasized that there are tech-
niques other than admissibility standards for preventing wrongful
verdicts based on scientific testimony. The Justice noted that in some
cases in which the proponent can satisfy the Daubert admissibility
test, the judge will nevertheless be entitled to rule the proponent's
case legally insufficient: "[I]n the event the trial court concludes that
the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient
to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely
than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment ... and
likewise to grant summary judgment .... ,121 The Justice then cited
several cases in which appellate courts had ruled as a matter of law
that a proponent's case was insufficient to make out a submissible
case.
Justice Blackmun added that even when a proponent's scientific
testimony is both admissible and legally sufficient to sustain the ini-
tial burden of production, the opponent may attack the weight of the
testimony. The Justice specifically acknowledged the possibility that
proffered scientific testimony could be "shaky but admissible."
123
The Justice noted that the opponent may conduct "[v]igorous cross-
examination" of the proponent's experts and call experts to "present
... contrary evidence" to the trier.124 The Justice described "[t]hese
conventional devices" as "the appropriate safeguards" for accurate
verdicts rather than "uncompromising" admissibility standards.125
In a fervor to prevent wrongful verdicts based on "junk science,"
it is easy to overlook the distinction among the concepts of the admis-
sibility, legal sufficiency, and weight of scientific testimony. 126 How-
ever, Justice Blackmun underscored these distinctions, and the avail-
ability of legal sufficiency and weight attacks provide another reason
why the courts should not incorporate a best evidence principle into
the admissibility standards for scientific testimony. 127 The argument
121 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,596 (1993).
12 See id. (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992) and Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990)).
123 See id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After Daubert: Some Early Returns from
Lower Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 23, 28-30 (warning against a tendency to conflate the ad-
missibility and legal sufficiency standards).
127 See Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that to qualify for
admission, an expert opinion "need not be so persuasive as to meet a party's burden of proof or
even necessarily its burden of production").
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that a proponent's proffered testimony is not the "best" scientific evi-
dence sounds in legal sufficiency and weight rather than in admissi-
bility.
1. Legal Sufficiency Attacks
In some cases, a proponent's failure to present any expert testi-
mony is fatal to the legal sufficiency of the proponent's case. Profes-
sional malpractice cases are illustrative. In those cases, the substan-
tive tort law standard explicitly refers to the standards of practice rec-
ognized by the discipline: The plaintiff must demonstrate that the de-
fendant practitioner deviated from an accepted standard.128 The very
phrasing of the substantive liability test requires proof of the profes-
sional standard. Consequently, as a general proposition, in legal
129
and medical130 cases, an utter failure to present expert testimony man-
dates a directed verdict or nonsuit in the defendant's favor.
In other cases, a proponent's failure to present a better variety of
scientific testimony can render the proponent's case legally insuffi-
cient. As previously stated, there is a substantial body of case law
upholding the admissibility of drug identification testimony based on
the visual identification of an unknown substance.131 However, some
of the same courts admitting such testimony caution that, "[w]e sus-
123 See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
187 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the practitioner is required to "have and use the knowledge, skill,
and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing").
129 See, e.g., Focus Inv. Assoc. v. Am. Title Ins., 992 F.2d 1231, 1239 (1st Cir. 1993)
("[Tihe most widely accepted rule is that a legal malpractice plaintiff must present expert testi-
mony establishing the appropriate standard of care ...."); Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d
787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that expert testimony is generally necessary to establish the
standard of care in legal malpractice cases); Briggs v. Cochran, 17 F. Supp.2d 453, 461 (D. Md.
1998) (same); Goebel v. Lauderdale, 263 Cal. Rptr. 275, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Only a
person knowledgeable in the specialty can define the applicable duty of care and render an
opinion on whether it was met."); Beattie v. Fimschild, 394 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that since a violation of the code of ethics is not malpractice per se, expert testimony is
still required to establish the standard of care).
13 See, e.g., Rolon-Alvarado v. Mun. of San Juan, 1 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that the standard of care in medical malpractice cases must "ordinarily be established by expert
testimony"); Howard v. TMW Enter., Inc., 32 F. Supp.2d 1244, 1252 (D. Kan. 1998) (same);
Blaz v. Galen Hosp. Ill., Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1231, 1232 (N.D. ill. 1998) ("Under illinois law,
[the plaintiff] must present expert testimony to establish within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that an act of the defendants caused his injury."); Morlan v. Harrington, 658 F. Supp.
24, 25 (D.N.D. 1986) (holding that "competent expert testimony is required under North Dakota
lav to make out a prima facie case of medical malpractice"); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Medical
Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1992) ("Generally, when the ordinary care of a physician is an
issue, only experts can testify and establish the standard of care and skill required."). There is a
strong argument that as a general proposition, expert testimony should also be required in cases
involving alleged laboratory malpractice. See, e.g., Cooper v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 150
F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a negligence action against a laboratory was an
action for professional malpractice, and that expert testimony was therefore usually required to
establish the requisite standard of care).
131 See Blanchard & Chin, supra note 89, at 562-65 (describing the "disintegration" of the
general rule against visual identification of controlled substances).
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pect it would be a rare case in which a witness's statement that a par-
ticular substance looked like a controlled substance would alone be
sufficient to support a conviction.' ' 132 In a number of additional cases,
the courts have held that although admissible, testimony about non-
specific drug identification tests is legally insufficient to establish the
identity of the substance.
133
2. Weight Attacks
Assume that the judge rules that the proponent's scientific testi-
mony is legally sufficient as well as admissible. Even at this point,
the opponent has available arguments, namely, attacks on the weight
or believability of the testimony. The opinions recognize that during
summation, the opponent may argue that the trier should attach little
or no weight to the testimony proffered by the proponent precisely
because the proponent has neglected to present "available,"
"stronger" evidence. 134 In many jurisdictions, on the opponent's re-
quest, the judge will even instruct the jury that, "[i]f a party offers
weaker or less satisfactory evidence when stronger and more satis-
factory evidence could have been produced at trial, you may, but are
not required to consider this fact in your deliberations."
This principle has been applied to scientific testimony. 136 Sup-
pose, for instance, that the question is the accused's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged offense. If the prosecution relies on lay
eyewitness testimony, during closing argument the defense may
highlight the prosecution's failure to present blood typing 137 or fin-
132 Id. at 562 (citing Commonwealth v. Dawson, 504 N.E.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Mass. 1987)).
13 See People v. Hagberg, 703 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a field
test was not conclusive in establishing the presence of a controlled substance), appeal granted,
712 N.E.2d 820 (11. 1999). See also 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 80, § 23-5, at
326-27 (collecting cases).
'34 See Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 659 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988) (recognizing
"the general rule that failure to produce available evidence which is stronger than relied on at
trial justifies an inference that the stronger evidence would be unfavorable").
135 1 EDWARD J. DEVIT ET AL, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 14.14, at 458 (4th ed. 1992).
136 See Sample v. State, 550 A.2d 661 (Md. 1988) (holding that it was reversible error for a
trial court to prohibit a criminal defendant from commenting on the unexplained lack of finger-
print evidence); State v. Eley, 419 A.2d 384 (Md. 1980) (same); People v. Carter, 392 N.E.2d
188, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) ("[D]efects in identification procedures are proper matters for the
jury to consider, and a defendant has the right to argue the issue."); see also EDWARD J.
IMVWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATrACKING SCIENTIIC EVIDENCE § 10-8, at 305-06 (3d ed.
1997) (suggesting a method of cross examining an expert witness who offers evidence derived
from an inferior test); F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 488-89 (1978) (same).
137 Cf. Fluellen v. Campbell, 683 F. Supp. 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (denying appeal on the
grounds that prosecutor's reference to the fact that defendant failed to take a blood test was
harmless given the fact that defendant first made reference to the fact that the prosecutors had
not presented any blood evidence which implicated the defendant).
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gerprint 13 8 evidence. The defense may argue that the missing scien-
tific evidence would be superior proof of identity and that the jury
should discount the proffered testimony due to the failure to present
"better" evidence.
In short, the opponent is certainly within his or her rights to point
out that the proponent has failed to submit the "best" scientific evi-
dence. That point is relevant at a trial, but it is far more appropriate to
make that point as a legal sufficiency or weight attack rather than as a
basis for constructing an order of preference among the various types
of proffered evidence.
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANOTHER VERSION OF THE
PROPOSAL, NAMELY, AS A STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE FOUNDATION FOR PROFFERED SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
Part III dealt with one version of a best evidence principle for
admissibility analysis under Article VII. That version of the principle
would operate on the proffered evidence itself:.139 If the proponent
proffered a type of scientific evidence that was "inferior" to another
type of scientific evidence that might be offered, the proffered item
would be inadmissible. By way of example, assume that in a case in
which a key issue is the chemical composition of an unknown drug,
the proponent proffers a nonspecific gas chromatography (GC) test.
The proponent contemplates directly submitting the GC chart to the
jurors for their inspection. If the court enforced a best evidence prin-
ciple as an order of preference, when the proponent proffers a non-
specific test but it clearly would have been feasible to conduct a spe-
cific gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) test, testimony
about the TLC test would be inadmissible.
However, a best evidence principle could operate at another level
under Article VII. Rather than focusing on the proffered item of evi-
dence, the principle could regulate the sufficiency of the foundation
for the proffered item of evidence. 14 Assume, for instance, that the
138 See 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 80, § 16-11, at 524-27 (collecting
cases).
19 California Evidence Code §§ 400-01 codify the distinction between the proffered evi-
dence and its foundation. § 400 reads in pertinent part:
As used in this article, "preliminary [or foundational] fact" means a fact upon the
existence or nonexistence of which depends the admissibility or inadmissibility of
evidence.
For its part, Evidence Code § 401 provides:
As used in this article, "proffered evidence" means evidence, the admissibility or in-
admissibility of which is dependent upon the existence or nonexistence of a prelimi-
nary [or foundational] fact.
CAL EVID. CODE §§ 400-01 (West 1995).
140 See id. (recognizing the distinction between an item of proffered evidence and the
foundation for the item).
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proffered item of evidence is simply an expert's opinion that the un-
known sample is an organophosphate pesticide. In this variation of
the hypothetical, the proponent does not intend to submit the GC
chart directly to the jury. Rather, the proponent would be content to
have the expert mention the GC test as the foundation or predicate for
the proffered opinion. The opponent might argue that as a matter of
law, the foundation is inadequate because a GCMS test would be a
better, preferable basis for the proffered opinion. Since the passages
suggesting a best evidence proposal appear in their supplement's dis-
cussion of Daubert's foundational requirement, it seems more likely
that Professor Faigman and his co-authors favor this version of the
best evidence principle. Hence, the question arises: Even if there
should not be an order of preference among the kinds of proffered
scientific testimony, should the judge incorporate a species of best
evidence reasoning into his or her evaluation of the adequacy of the
foundation? It is submitted that once again, the answer should be no.
A. When the Question Posed is the Sufficiency of a Foundation, the
Issue is Whether the Foundation is Adequate to Support the Specific
Opinion Proffered, Not Whether the Expert has Relied on the Best
Scientific Technique Available
As a general proposition, the adequacy of a "foundation" for a
proffered item of evidence must be judged relative to the terms of the
proffer. Suppose, for example, that in a homicide case, the defendant
claims self-defense. At trial, the defense proffers the defendant's tes-
timony that before the fatal encounter, he received a threatening letter
purportedly written by the alleged victim. When the defense proffers
the testimony solely on the question of the defendant's state of mind,
it would be a sufficient foundation for the defendant to testify from
personal knowledge that he in fact received a menacing letter which
bore the alleged victim's purported signature. Even if the defendant
were mistaken about the authorship of the letter, the contents of the
letter could make the defendant more fearful of the alleged victim.
Assume, however, that the defense proffered the testimony in
order to establish that the alleged victim had an animus toward the
defendant to support a further inference that on the occasion in ques-
tion, the alleged victim struck the first blow. 141 That proffer is radi-
141 The character evidence prohibition would not bar the evidence of the alleged victim's
threat even if the threat amounted to a crime. The first sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) codifies the prohibition and precludes a proponent from offering evidence of a person's
uncharged misdeeds on the simplistic theory that "He did it once, ergo he did it again." How-
ever, the second sentence of the statute legitimates noncharacter theories of logical relevance.
The second specifically lists "motive" as a proper noncharacter theory. The cases are legion
holding that if a hatred or animus might have motivated an alleged act, other misdeeds evi-
dencing the misdeed are admissible over a character evidence objection. See 1 EDWARD J.
MvlWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 3:18 (rev. 1999).
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cally different. By the terms of that proffer, the defense is not only
alleging that the defendant received a threatening letter purportedly
written by the alleged victim; the defense is also claiming that the
alleged victim actually wrote the letter. Unless the defendant can add
that he is familiar with the alleged victim's handwriting style, 14 2 with-
out more the defendant's testimony would be an inadequate founda-
tion. 143 The foundation is adequate relative to the claim about the
defendant's state of mind but insufficient relative to the claim about
the alleged victim's state of mind and conduct. These examples il-
lustrate the generalization that the judge must gauge the sufficiency of
a foundation relative to the terms or tenor of the proffer.
The generalization applies to expert opinion testimony. The Su-
preme Court honored the generalization in its 1997 opinion, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,144 applying Daubert. There the plaintiff prof-
fered doctors' testimony that the plaintiffs exposure to polychlori-
nated biphenyls (PCBs) "more likely than not" caused his lung can-
cer.145 The doctors based their opinions in part on animal studies.
146
The trial judge excluded the opinions, and on appeal the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial judge's ruling. The Court did not announce a
sweeping, best evidence ruling that an opinion must always be based
on epidemiological research rather than animal studies.147 Rather, the
Court emphasized that the narrow question presented was "was
whether these experts' opinions were sufficiently supported by the
animal studies on which they purported to rely."' 48 The Court con-
cluded that there was "simply too great an analytical gap between the
[animal] data and the opinion[s] proffered."'149 The Court did not in-
quire whether the plaintiffs' experts rested their opinion on the best
possible type of scientific evidence. Instead, the Court assessed the
adequacy of the foundation in light of the specific terms of the prof-
fer.
To reinforce the point, consider two hypotheticals in which the
proponent offers a police officer's opinion that an unknown sample
either definitely was or might have been cocaine.
In the first version of the hypothetical, the proceeding is a drug
prosecution. The proponent is the prosecutor. The prosecutor calls
142 See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (stating that non-expert testimony on genuineness of
handwriting is admissible if based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of litigation).
143 See EDWARD J. IwVINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 44-45 (4th ed. 1998)
(outlining the proper evidentiary foundation for a letter).
'44 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
141 SeekL at518.
146 See id.
147 Id. ("[W]hether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion
was not the issue ... ").
148 Id. (emphasis in original).
149 Id. at 519.
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the police officer who arrested the defendant. The officer testifies
that before the arrest, she observed the defendant swallow a sub-
stance. The officer adds that at the police academy, she received
training in the visual recognition of contraband substances. Based on
that foundation, the prosecutor attempts to adduce the officer's opin-
ion that the substance was "definitely" crack cocaine. If the prosecu-
tion has no other evidence of the substance's identity, as a practical
matter the prosecutor must proffer an opinion that purports to be that
definite. Otherwise, the prosecutor will not have a submissible case
and, consequently, would suffer a directed verdict or judgment as a
matter of law at the close of the government's case-in-chief. 150 In
Robinson v. State,151 a recent case in point, the Maryland court held
that this foundation is insufficient to support that opinion.152  The
court stressed that the prosecution had not been content to adduce the
officer's opinion that the substance looked like crack cocaine or
might have been crack cocaine. The prosecutor had attempted to
proffer a much more definite opinion; and the foundation did not
measure up to the terms of the proffer. The opinion was consequently
inadmissible.
Now turn to a second variation of the hypothetical. In this
variation, the proceeding is a homicide prosecution. The proponent is
the defense. The defense is endeavoring to use voluntary intoxication
to negate a specific mens rea element of the charged offense such as
the premeditation element of first-degree murder. In some jurisdic-
tions, a defendant's voluntary drug or alcohol intoxication can serve
to negate a special mens rea element of the alleged offense. 153 How-
ever, precisely because the special mens rea is an element of the
charged offense rather than of a true affirmative defense, the defense
may prevail by simply "rais[ing] a reasonable doubt as to the exis-
tence of the [element]."' 154 In Judge Weinstein's classic survey, most
judges questioned indicated that there is a reasonable doubt when the
probability of guilt falls short of 85% or 90%. 1*55 Thus, as a practical
matter an accused can gain an acquittal by presenting evidence that
raises a 10% or 15% probability of innocence. In that light, the de-
15o See 2 EDWARD J. JMWINKELRIBD ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENcE § 2918 (3d
ed. 1998).
s'' 702 A.2d 741 (Md. 1997).
152 See id.
"' See United States v. Abeyta, 27 F.3d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that vol-
untary intoxication may negate specific intent). Cf. United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1989) (affirming an assault conviction of an intoxicated defendant on the grounds that assault
was not a specific intent crime). But cf United States v. Landau, 956 F. Supp. 1160, 1163
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the responsible person statute in the Internal Revenue Code is not
a specific intent crime and thus voluntary intoxication is not an available defense).
'- CAL. EVID. CODE § 607 (West 1995).
155 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (surveying District
Court judges in the Eastern District of New York).
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fense calls the same police officer who testified in the initial variation
of the hypothetical. Again, the officer observed the defendant ingest
a substance that looked suspiciously like crack cocaine. Suppose that
the officer made the observation two hours before the fatal encounter.
The defense proffers the officer's opinion that the substance looked
like and "might" have been crack cocaine--the very type of opinion
that the Maryland court distinguished in Robinson. The defendant's
ingestion of crack cocaine shortly before the encounter with the al-
leged victim might have rendered the defendant drug intoxicated.
It is submitted that in this variation of the hypothetical, the
opinion qualifies for admission. To be sure, opinions, based on the
superficial appearance of the substance, might be error prone. These
opinions are subject to such a substantial margin of error that even
given the officer's police academy training, the officer's visual obser-
vation would be an inadequate basis for an opinion that the substance
was "definitely" crack cocaine. It is true that in the second variation
of the hypothetical, the defense is calling the same officer as a witness
and the officer is again relying on her training and visual observation.
The defense, however, is proffering a very different opinion; the de-
fense is tendering the weaker opinion that the substance "might" have
been crack cocaine. It is immaterial that opinions based on an offi-
cer's visual assessment of a substance might be wrong 40% of the
time. As a practical matter, to raise a reasonable doubt, the defense
need establish only a 10% or 15% probability of voluntary intoxica-
tion. Interestingly enough, in a similar context, although at trial most
courts bar inculpatory results of passive alcohol screening (P.A.S.)
devices that test a defendant's breath alcohol concentration, 56 there is
authority that exculpatory results yielded by the same devices are ad-
missible. 157 The margin of error in such testing is so significant that
an inculpatory P.A.S. result will not support an opinion that the de-
fendant was intoxicated. Despite the error margin, however, as a
matter of logic an exculpatory result could be probative enough to
create a reasonable doubt about the defendant's intoxication.
1-6 See EDWARD J. MWINKELRIED & NORmAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE:
THE AccuseD's CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE § 6-5b, at
183-84 (2d ed. 1996) (summarizing the limited use of passive alcohol screening devices by
prosecutors).
'5 See UdL § 6-5b, at 184 (citing Patrick v. State, 750 S.W.2d 391 (Ark. 1988) which re-
versed a drunk driving conviction after the trial court failed to admit breathalyzer test results
that indicated that the defendant was not intoxicated).
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B. The Administration of this Version of a Best Evidence Principle
under Article VII Would Require Trial Judges to Become
"Meta-scientists"
In his opinion in Daubert,158 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
some misgivings about the majority's decision to require federal trial
judges to directly assess the reliability of proffered scientific evi-
dence. Under the prior Frye test, judges focused on a surrogate for
reliability, namely, general acceptance. 159  However, the Daubert
majority decided to abandon that surrogate and task trial judges to
pass on the merit of proposed scientific testimony. On the one hand,
the Chief Justice insisted that he "defer[red] to no one in [his] confi-
dence in federal judges .... ,160 On the other hand, he feared that trial
judges would have to "become amateur scientists" to shoulder the
responsibilities the majority assigned them. 161  Many lower court
judges have echoed the Chief Justice's sentiment. On remand in
Daubert, Judge Alex Kozinski described the task of conducting a
Daubert reliability inquiry as "daunting."' 162 More recently, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit observed: "[C]horeographing the
Daubert pavane remains an exceedingly difficult task. Few federal
judges are scientists, and none are trained in even a fraction of the
many scientific fields in which experts may seek to testify."'163
If Daubert strains the institutional competence of the trial judici-
ary, incorporating a best evidence principle into Daubert analysis will
compound the problem. It is one thing to expect a trial judge with
little scientific training to master enough of the rudiments of a par-
ticular scientific technique to determine how it should be properly
applied and how probative it is when correctly utilized. When the
proponent's expert relies on an epidemiological study as the sole sup-
port for an opinion about medical causation, the judge may have to
become enough of an "amateur"' 64 epidemiologist to determine
whether the findings in the study are "appropriate validation" for the
ultimate opinion.' It is certainly understandable that a generalist
judge would use the adjective "daunting ' 166 or "difficult ' 167 to de-
158 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
159 Bert Black et al., supra note 24, at 722-35 (reviewing the general acceptance test of
Frye as a substitute for determining the validity of the science at issue in a particular case).
'60 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600.
161 See id. at 601.
162 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 869 (1995).
163 Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling, 161 F.3d 77, 81 (Ist Cir. 1998).
164 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
165 See id. at 590.
16 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 869 (1995).
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scribe the prospect of immersing himself or herself in the science of
epidemiology to that extent.
Incorporating a best evidence principle into Daubert analysis
would introduce a whole new layer of difficulty into the judicial task.
It would no longer be sufficient for the judge to learn enough about
epidemiology to ask whether the expert had properly utilized the
technique and whether the expert's finding was sufficiently probative
to support the proffered opinion. In addition, the judge would have to
make a further inquiry whether an epidemiological analysis was the
"best" scientific approach to resolving the question presented in the
case. To conduct that inquiry, the judge would have to become an
amateur meta-scientist, identifying the optimal scientific technique
for answering the question. The problem arises because several dif-
ferent scientific disciplines could conceivably bear on the question
posed in a given case. As Judge Robert Jones remarked in Hall v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp.,168 a number of scientific fields can be rele-
vant to a single question in a case. Hall was a civil tort action against
breast implant manufacturers. In Judge Jones' words, Hall's theory
of causation brought "four... areas of science into play: epidemio-
logy; rheumatology; immunology/toxicology; and polymer chemis-
try.' 169 Judge Jones described the case as "complicated.' 70 He went
to the length of appointing four technical advisors-one for each of
the distinct scientific disciplines involved . After reviewing their
reports, Judge Jones painstakingly scrutinized the plaintiffs evidence
in each field.'7 2 He worked through the disciplines one by one; in
each field, he addressed two questions, namely, whether the plain-
tiff's expert had properly applied the pertinent techniques to reach a
finding and, if so, how probative the finding was.
173
Judge Jones' mode of analysis is sound and tailored to resolve the
question of whether the scientific reasoning the expert relies on as the
basis for his or her ultimate opinion is adequate. Faced with a foun-
dational objection, the trial judge must determine whether the propo-
nent's predicate has enough probative worth to justify the proffered
opinion. The judge can make that determination if he or she decides
whether the expert has properly applied the scientific methodologies
and, if so, how significant the expert's findings are. There is no need
for the judge to inquire further whether another expert from another
scientific discipline might have used a different, "better" technique to
arrive at an opinion. The opponent can always point to the existence
167 See Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 81.
168 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
169 Id. at 1402.
'7" See id. at 1392.
"' See ida at 1392-93.
'7 See id. at 1393-1415.
173 See id.
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of that other, allegedly "better" technique in order to attack the weight
of the proponent's evidence. However, there is no need for the trial
judge to reach that issue at the admissibility stage when the only
question presented is whether this specific foundation is sufficient for
this specific item of proffered evidence. The relevant comparison is
the probative worth of the foundation and the terms of the prof-
fer--not whether it would be possible or feasible for the proponent to
lay a different foundation for the proffered item.
V. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, I have the highest regard for Professor
Faigman and his co-authors. I may simply be reading too much into a
few, isolated passages in their 1999 supplement. However, those pas-
sages strike me as lending themselves to the interpretation that the
authors support the incorporation of some sort of best evidence prin-
ciple into admissibility analysis under Daubert. Given the authors'
stature in the field, other readers, including judges, are likely to pay
close attention to the new supplement. 174 My fear is that if those
readers interpret these passages in the same manner as I have, the pas-
sages will be productive of mischief.
If anything, "mischief' is an understatement. As Part II ex-
plained, the incorporation of a best evidence principle into the stan-
dards governing the admissibility of opinion evidence would repre-
sent a dramatic change. With the exception of the best evidence rule
confined to documentary evidence, 175 neither common-law nor statu-
tory admissibility standards recognize a preference for: scientific tes-
timony over lay factual testimony, expert opinion over lay opinion,
scientific opinion over non-scientific expert testimony, or certain,
supposedly superior types of scientific evidence over other types of
scientific testimony. Recognizing a best evidence principle operative
in Article VII of the Federal Rules would fly in the face of the text
and legislative history of that article. The drafters of the Federal
Rules had their doubts about the wisdom of even the best evidence
rule proper, and there are affirmative indications that they rejected the
extension of the best evidence principle to the admissibility norms set
out in Article VII.
At trial, it is certainly relevant for the opponent to point out that
the proponent has neglected to present the "best" scientific evidence.
However, the point is relevant to the legal sufficiency and weight of
scientific testimony, not its admissibility. Justice Blackmun high-
174 The Supreme Court repeatedly cited the authors' text in United States v. Scheffer, 523
U.S. 303 (1998).
'75 See FED. R. EvlD. 1001-02.
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lighted that distinction in the majority opinion in Daubert.176 Incor-
porating a best evidence principle into Article VII admissibility
analysis would blur the distinction that Justice Blackmun went to
some length to draw in Daubert. Thus, any proposal to extend the
principle to this context-either an order of preference among types
of proffered scientific evidence or a regulation of the sufficiency of
the foundation for proffered scientific testimony-is undesirable as a
matter of evidentiary policy.
The apparent proposal raises other concerns as well. At one
point in their supplement, the authors suggest that the courts should
shape their admissibility standards to encourage certain types of sci-
entific research. In the authors' words, "[a]dmissibility rules have a
significant impact on the way, and whether, research is done."177 The
question is whether the courts have the institutional competence to
make decisions as to how the scientific community should spend its
research resources. It is one thing for the courts to decide which
types of scientific testimony are reliable enough to serve as a basis for
a verdict adjudicating civil liability or criminal responsibility. It is
quite another matter to factor into the courts' decision a consideration
of the preferable directions in scientific research. An assessment of
reliability properly falls within the courts' bailiwick. In contrast, a
judicial attempt to influence the course of scientific research would be
presumptuous and misguided.
Finally, incorporating a best evidence principle into admissibility
analysis under Daubert has implications for social justice.178  The
authors' "marketplace" metaphor is apt.179 In this "marketplace for
experts,"'180 relatively few experts provide their services free of
charge. Litigants must ordinarily pay for the services, and those
services can be quite expensive~lgl Wealthy litigants already enjoy a
marked advantage in access to expert witness resources. An indigent
plaintiff may call a lay witness to corroborate the plaintiff's version of
a traffic accident, but a wealthy corporate defendant can up the ante
by presenting an expert in accident reconstruction to contradict the
176 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
"n 1 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.413], at 15.
178 The poet Oliver Goldsmith once wrote: "Laws grind the poor, and rich men rule the
law." The Traveller, Line 386.
179 See 1 FAGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.4[3], at 15 ("As in most markets, if the law
proves to be a bad consumer, it is more likely to get a bad product. But, [if it] is a good con-
sumer, it can demand and receive a quality product.").
's0 Id
181 See, e.g., Note, Robyn L Thieman, Property Devaluation Caused by Fear of Electro-
magnetic Fields: Using Damages to Encourage Utilities to Act Efficiently, 71 N.Y.U. L REv.
1386, 1406 (1996) (discussing the expense of litigating the question of whether electromagnetic
fields can cause cancer and noting that the expert witness fees "can be staggering" ).
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lay witnesses' testimony. 182 Under the present state of the law, "dis-
parity in resources" can cause differential access to experts and pro-
duce miscarriages of justice. 183 The poor cannot obtain the same
"measure" of justice that is "available to those who can afford to re-
tain experts in the kinds of cases in which expert testimony is either
essential or necessar to the best and most effective presentation of
the litigant's case.' '1  The less affluent are already handicapped in
litigation regardless of the legal merit of their position.18
5
Incorporating a best evidence principle into admissibility analy-
sis under Daubert will only compound the handicap facing less afflu-
ent litigants. In the status quo, the poorer party can often reach the
trial stage. Even though he or she may have not have the "best," most
expensive scientific testimony, their testimony may be admissible
enough and sufficient to make out a submissible case. If the status
quo were modified by factoring a best evidence principle into admis-
sibility analysis, as a practical matter it would raise the bar for even
reaching trial. The "best" scientific evidence could be "prohibitively
expensive"'186 for a litigant of modest means. Lacking the means to
afford costly scientific testimony, less affluent litigants would be
more vulnerable to summary judgment motions. 187 The poor will be
less likely to obtain a day in court. At the very least, the extension of
the best evidence principle to this context would weaken the settle-
ment position of less wealthy litigants.
As Professor Faigman and his colleagues note, the pivotal issue
is how much validating research is "enough" to satisfy Daubert.' In
another article, I have advanced the tentative thesis that there is
"enough" validation when the proponent's foundation establishes that
an hypothesis has been verified by an empirical study which: (1) is
based on a large, representative database; (2) was conducted under
conditions approximating those in the instant case; and (3) yielded a
validity rate justifying the definiteness of the tendered opinion. 189
182 See 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 80, § 27 (summarizing theory of acci-
dent reconstruction and admissibility of expert testimony).
183 See MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUizEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION 60 (1983) (discussing how external factors to litigation, including economic dispar-
ity, can affect the use of available resources).
184 Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd,
554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977) (holding that a disciplinary rule for-
bidding attorneys from paying witnesses on a contingency basis, while inherently unfair to less
affluent litigants, was not invalid).
"s See id. at 146.
186 See Capra, supra note 101, at 728.
"7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
'88 See 1 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 21, § 1-3.4[3], at 13-14 (noting that in some in-
stances testimony based on experience alone may be sufficient, while in others it may not).
189 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Judge as Daubert Gatekeeper: Adapting Old Maps to the
Unfamiliar Terrain of the "'Brave New Worl, " PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND THE LAW (forthcoming).
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When that is the state of the proponent's evidentiary foundation, it
can be said that the hypothesis has been "derived by the scientific
method"'19 and is "supported by [enough] appropriate validation."'191
Enough should be deemed enough even when the proponent has not
presented the very best which science has to offer. To borrow Shake-
speare's phrase, if the courts lash out at "junk science" by insisting
that the proponent of scientific evidence always tender the best, we
may "mar what's well" in the law governing the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony.
190 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,590 (1993).
191 Id.

